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Unintended consequences or ambivalent policy objectives? 
Conflict minerals and mining reform in the DR Congo1 
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Abstract 
Since the early 2000s, the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the international 
community have initiated a reform process in the artisanal mining sector to break the linkages 
between mineral extraction and violent conflict. Research on the reforms reaches different 
conclusions about their impact on conflict, governance and livelihoods, and usually focuses on one 
aspect of the reforms, accepting the objectives of the policy at face value.  This discourse analysis of 
the objectives of reform policies aims to understand how they represent the problem, the solutions 
they envision and their proposed plans. The study applied the method of interpretive policy analysis 
to four policy documents originating from 2010 to 2012: the UN Group of Experts report, the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, and the ICGLR 
Regional Certification Mechanism Manual. The study finds that the policies hinge on two seemingly 
commensurate objectives, varying between conflict-free sourcing and promoting peace. We find 
that, in reality, these objectives may not align. We also find that much reform practice is geared 
towards conflict-free sourcing, and is far less appropriate for promoting peace. This includes the 
tendency to implement the policies in conflict-free zones, their narrow scope, the reliance on the 
government and their indifference to the impact of the reforms for poor miners. The findings suggest 
that exercising due diligence has become a goal in itself. This raises the question of whether giving 
buyers a clear conscience and developing a traceable and conflict-free product has received more 
prominence than has contributing to improving the situation of the Congolese population. 
 
Introduction 
 
Publications on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) often begin with the startling contradiction 
that one of the richest countries in the world in terms of natural resources is also marred by deep 
poverty, stagnation, the breakdown of governance and ongoing conflict. Since the early 2000s, it has 
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become common to view this situation less as a contradiction than as an inevitable outcome, with 
control over precious mineral deposits providing both the incentive for and the resources 
underpinning violent conflict. Congolese armed groups—both rebels and public forces—use the so-
called ‘conflict minerals’ trade to finance their war efforts, to enrich themselves, and to grease the 
wheels of patronage. A large number of policy initiatives designed to break the cycle of conflict and 
the exploitation of mineral resources have changed the character of artisanal mining in eastern DRC 
substantially. In a country where change often seems elusive, the mineral sector has seen a 
substantial makeover in just a few years’ time, as a result of both national and international 
interventions. This includes changes in the sector’s governance and taxation structures, the 
introduction of cooperatives, and the launch of traceability and certification schemes. 
 
The reforms in DRC’s artisanal and small-scale mining sector form an interesting case for debates 
about the unintended consequences of development initiatives. The introduction of many initiatives 
in a short time span has resulted in a significant amount of implementation activity, triggering a great 
deal of research on the effects of the reforms. Since the start of the reforms’ implementation in 
2010–2011, there have been fierce debates concerning the success, viability and—especially—the 
(un)intended consequences of these initiatives. Policy makers and NGOs have highlighted the 
positive effects of the initiatives on enhanced transparency and good governance (OECD 2012: 10). 
There have also been claims that the initiatives have led to a substantial decrease in militarisation, 
from almost 100% in 2010 to 33% in 2014 (Bafilemba et al. 2014: 8–9). These positive assessments 
have been contested by other research, which has cast doubts on the militarisation and governance 
effects and pointed to unintended consequences of the reforms, especially on the livelihoods of 
Congolese mining communities and small-scale Congolese mineral traders, as will be elaborated in 
detail in the next section. 
 
Remarkably, the different streams of research on the artisanal mining reforms—whether focusing on 
intended or unintended consequences—seem to have taken the ‘intentions’ of the policies for 
granted. This does not mean that the design and assumptions of the reform policies have escaped 
critical discussion. Several scholars have analysed the problematic design of Western policy 
interventions in DRC, on conflict mineral policy in particular. Autesserre (2012) and Seay (2012) have 
pointed out misconceptions in conflict mineral policy on the relationship between the mining sector 
and conflict in DRC. Other researchers have noted the overly technical approach of the reforms 
(Geenen 2012); the erroneous representation of Congo’s mining sector as criminal, unregulated and 
militarised (Koddenbrock 2012; Nest 2011); and the frequent and incorrect association of state 
weakness in DRC with the absence of governance (Radley and Vogel 2015). However, these critical 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
observations have usually served only to provide a commentary on the design of the policies to 
introduce empirical work that analysed the consequences of a single intervention from the wide 
range of initiatives. 
In contrast, this article takes the design of these policies as the primary subject of analysis. The study 
explores a key set of policies, posing several important questions: How do the policies frame the 
problématique of conflict minerals? How do they view its solutions? What objectives are embedded 
into the policies? Which assumptions are interwoven into the policies about the context in which 
they are intended and expected to work? 
This article rests on the premise that, to discuss the intended and unintended consequences of a 
policy, it is important to understand its ‘intentions’. We conducted a discourse analysis of four policy 
documents that have been central in the developments making the 3T3 mineral trade in DRC more 
transparent: the 2010 UN Group of Experts report on DRC, section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (2011), and the International Conference on the Great Lake 
Region (ICGLR) Regional Certification Mechanism Manual (2011). These policy documents form the 
backbone of many ongoing initiatives and are often cited in the conflict mineral debate. The present 
article examines their problem analyses and proposed solutions. Finding that these policies are less 
uniform in their objectives than is usually assumed, we explore how this analysis can help us to 
understand some of the alleged unintended consequences of the policies. 
 
The article also seeks to contribute to the growing literature on the unintended consequences of 
development programmes. This literature has focused mainly on effects brought about during 
implementation, when the ‘interventions intrude into a reacting system’ (Sherrill 1984: 31). These 
unintended consequences result from human mistakes during planning and implementation or from 
complexities in the realities of intervention (Koch and Schulpen 2017: 5). Existing work has taken the 
‘intentions’ of policy for granted, and there has been far less attention to the policy side of the 
equation. Policy attention that has been there, draws attention to hidden intentions, and it has been 
pointed out that unintended consequences may actually have been anticipated and—although 
undesired—accepted as inevitable trade-offs or side-effects (ibid). However, little attention has been 
given to the inconsistencies, contradictions and lack of clarity in the policies that stem from the 
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complexity of policy making. This complexity may provide at least a partial explanation for some of 
the observed consequences. Using a detailed case study of the artisanal mining reforms in DRC, the 
present study further explores unintended consequences by highlighting the importance of viewing 
policy making as a social process rather than merely a rational exercise linking clearly defined goals 
to courses of action (Colebatch, 1989). Policy making is a complex process, full of multiplicity and 
contradiction, which find their way into the wording of the resulting policies. Policy development 
includes an array of actors with diverging backgrounds, perspectives and objectives, and it is 
influenced by media, public pressure and current politics. This means research into unintended 
consequences should become more symmetrical, twinning the examination of interventions with an 
in-depth analysis of the policies that are being implemented. 
The first part of the article introduces the artisanal mining reforms and reviews the literature about 
their effects. This is followed by a section outlining the discourse analysis methods used to 
interrogate the policies. We then present the findings from the discourse analysis, before revisiting 
the literature on the conflict mineral reforms in light of our findings and proposing an alternative 
understanding of some of the findings of previous work. 
 
 
Mining reform initiatives in DRC 
In the early 2000s, a stream of reports4 linked the protracted crisis in Congo to the country’s natural 
resource sector, especially mining. These reports followed influential literature of the 1990s that 
maintained that greed (for natural resources) rather than grievance is the key driver of conflict 
(Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Advocacy groups, including the Enough Project 
and Global Witness, started campaigns on the issue of conflict minerals in DRC in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, linking Western consumer products to extreme human rights abuses, including sexual 
violence in eastern DRC. This pressured governments and multinational corporations to stop the 
looting of Congolese conflict minerals and to prevent the trade in those minerals from financing the 
war efforts of armed groups. As a result, parliamentary hearings and multi-stakeholder meetings 
were organised, and policy makers started to look for ways to break through the conflict cycles 
between Congo’s extractive industry and the proliferation of armed groups. 
Ensuring responsible mineral supply chains became a major priority of the international agenda in 
the late 2000s. In the following years, various stakeholders such as the United States government, 
international organisations, individual donor countries and the extractive industry developed an 
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array of 1) legislation, protocol and guidelines; 2) initiatives that implement supply chain tracking and 
certification; and 3) financial and technical support programmes. 
These interventions differ in terms of whether they are voluntary or mandatory, whether they are 
initiated by the private or public sector, and whether they operate on upstream mine sites or aim to 
regulate trade further downstream in the chain. Figure 1 provides an overview of the initiatives that 
were developed from 2009 to 2015, targeting cassiterite, coltan and wolframite mineral production 
and trade in Katanga. 
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the mineral supply chain and conflict mineral interventions. Note that 
this overview applies to DRC generally, and not only to Katanga 
Upstream (DRC–Great Lakes Region)     Downstream (Destination areas) 
 
 
Legislation, protocol and guidelines  
UN Group of Experts report 596, Chapters 8–10 (2010 l Public I Voluntary) 
US Dodd–Frank Act , Section 1502 (2010 I Public I Mandatory) 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance (2011 I Public I Voluntary) 
 EU Conflict Minerals Regulation (2021 I Public I Mandatory) 
 ICGLR RCM (2011-2012 I Public I Mandatory) 
 
Practical initiatives: supply chain tracking and certification 
 ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (2009 I Private) 
Closed Pipelines (CFTI/ SfH/ PSES) (2011–2012 I Private) 
       EICC and GeSI Conflict-Free Smelter programme (2011 I Private) 
 MONUSCO Centres de Négoce (2010 I Public)  
 BGR Certified Trading Chains (2008 I Public)  
Financial and technical support programmes 
 WB–DRC gov–DFID PROMINES (2012 I Public) 
  Public–Private Alliance for Responsible Mineral Trade (2011 I Public–Private) 
 
 
The development of legislative documents and guidelines started with the UN Security Council’s 
Group of Experts report 2010/596. Mandated since 2001 to investigate the link between conflict and 
the illegal extraction of natural resources in DRC, the Group reported on large-scale coltan smuggling 
from eastern DRC and how Western companies and Congolese warlords were implicated in illicit 
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deals. In 2010, the Group published recommendations on exercising due diligence throughout the 
supply chain, published as a five-step framework. 
The promulgation of the mandatory Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act by the Obama Administration followed in July 2010. The Act required US 
stock market-listed companies that sourced 3T minerals from DRC or neighbouring countries to verify 
the origin of these minerals and to exercise due diligence on both their mineral source and the chain 
of custody to avoid financing armed groups. Despite resistance from private industry, the Act was 
issued, followed in 2012 by a detailed strategy5 and a mandatory reporting system. 
The OECD developed its Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas in 2011, with the aim of inducing companies to exercise due 
diligence to prevent contributing to armed conflict. This document provided a five-step framework. 
Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) worked on its own regulations, agreeing on the legislative text 
in June 2016. The EU Conflict Minerals Regulations require importers of raw 3Tmaterials from 
conflict-affected and high-risk areas (not only Central Africa) to set up a due diligence system before 
21 January 2021. 
To implement these various guidelines and legislation, numerous initiatives were developed to 
facilitate responsible sourcing. Amongst these are initiatives enabling traceability through the supply 
chain, such as the widely implemented ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi), which provided a 
means for companies sourcing minerals from DRC to prove their chain of custody did not contribute 
to armed conflict; the creation of the Centres de Negoce by the UN peace mission MONUSCO and its 
partners; the establishment of pre-determined commercial partnerships between mine site 
operators, traders, smelters and manufacturers (called the ‘closed pipeline’); and the launch of the 
Conflict-Free Smelter Program in 2011, with the aim of facilitating electronic and IT industrial actors 
to foster social, environmental and economic sustainability. 
 
Another significant type of initiative launched from 2009 to 2011 concerns the certification of mine 
sites, traders and export lots. These initiatives include the German government-initiated Certified 
Trading Chains launched in 2009 in the Kivus and northern Katanga, as well as the Regional 
Certification Mechanism, established by the ICGLR two years later and adopted into Congolese law in 
2012, effectively replacing the Certified Trading Chains scheme. 
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The last type of conflict mineral interventions are financial and technical support programmes, 
including the 90 million programmes of PROMINES jointly funded by the World Bank and DFID, 
aiming to build capacity for strengthened artisanal mining sector management; and the Public–
Private Alliance for Responsible Mineral Trade, uniting USAID and private partners to give financial 
support to new initiatives responding to challenges within DRC’s mineral supply chain. 
 
Consequences of the reforms 
As it is not possible to review the consequences of all of the above initiatives in the scope of this 
article, this section summarises the main issues raised in the academic literature regarding the 
reforms’ consequences. Publications have noted many shortcomings, glitches and new problems that 
have appeared in the first five years of the implementation of the reforms. Here, we highlight three 
major concerns. 
With regard to the objective of reducing armed conflict, proponents and critics have not yet found 
common ground on the positive impact brought about by the interventions. A longitudinal data from 
an IPIS6 study on militarisation of 3T mine sites in eastern DRC, does point out a downward trend 
from almost 100% in 2010 to 33% in 2014 (IPIS 2015). And proponents of the reforms, like the NGO 
the Enough Project attribute these security improvements in eastern DRC to the policy initiatives 
(Bafilemba et al. 2014). Yet, several researchers have cast doubt to the extensiveness of these 
positive developments Although the militarisation of Congolese 3T mine sites does seem to have 
been reduced, IPIS itself has argued this militarisation has been displaced to the gold sector (IPIS 
2015). Others have questioned whether such reductions can be attributed to the reforms, rather 
than broader political and military developments (Vogel and Raeymaekers 2016: 14). Finally, past 
research has noted the continued influence of armed groups, whose commanders have found ways 
to continue operating in the project sites by using decoy companies consisting of family members to 
manage their day-to-day interests (Cuvelier et al. 2014: 12). 
Many researchers have criticised the unintended consequences of the reforms on the livelihoods of 
Congolese mining communities and small-scale Congolese mineral traders. Anticipating the 
introduction of the Dodd–Frank Act, President Kabila issued a temporary ban on artisanal mining in 
2010–2011. This heavily impacted the miners and the surrounding economies (Cuvelier et al. 2014; 
Geenen 2012.; Johnson 2013; Parker, Foltz and Elsea 2017; Seay 2012). In the years following the 
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in Eastern DRC since 2010. 
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ban, a large majority of people living in mining communities in Katanga have continuously 
experienced negative consequences of conflict mineral interventions on their livelihoods (Bashwira 
2017; Iguma 2017;). Changing mineral trade patterns have not only led to the withdrawal of 
international mineral buyers from the Congolese market (Cuvelier et al. 2014), but also impeded 
Katanga’s mining communities’ ability to benefit optimally from the mineral extraction and trade 
(Diemel 2016). The establishment of ‘closed pipelines’ and the emergence of a near monopsony by 
large-scale mineral buyers have restricted access to mineral trade for small-scale actors and hence 
reduced their income and negotiation position (Diemel and Cuvelier 2015; Freudenthal 2017; Iguma 
forthcoming). 
A third criticism concerns the limited pace and scope of the interventions during their first five years 
of implementation, especially in eastern DRC (Cuvelier et al. 2014; Diemel and Cuvelier 2015; Radley 
and Vogel 2015). In 2015, five years after the start of the initiatives, only 9% of east Congolese 3T and 
gold mine sites were incorporated into certification schemes (IPIS 2015), and only 4% of South Kivu’s 
mine sites were covered by traceability schemes (Radley and Vogel 2015: 407). Mostly caused by a 
lack of security and financial resources (Cuvelier et al. 2014), this slow pace of implementation risks 
the policy being mainly implemented in those provinces least affected by conflict, such as the former 
province of Katanga (Diemel and Cuvelier 2015). It also drives artisanal miners working outside of the 
incorporated mine sites into the margins of legality (Cuvelier et al. 2014). 
What do these three main issues (the uncertain outcomes on conflict, the effects on livelihoods, and 
the pace and scope of implementation) tell us about the reform policies? Do they point to 
unintended effects and misdirected programming, as the criticisms summarised above imply, or are 
these issues related to the nature of the reform policies? To answer this question, we conducted a 
discourse analysis of key policy papers that guided the reforms. 
 
Methods 
This study analysed four policy documents selected as key documents influencing the reform policies, 
based on a literature review and interviews. These four policy documents formed the backbone for 
the development of the many existing public and private initiatives and continue to guide much of 
the thinking in the conflict mineral debate. They reveal the problematic link between the extractive 
industry and conflict in DRC, propose a way forward by outlining standards, and indicate desired 
roles to be played by various stakeholder groups. Specifically, the documents analysed are as follows: 
• UN Group of Experts report on DRC of November 2010 (UN SC s/2010/596), Chapters 8–10  
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• Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), 
including the related US Strategy to Address the Linkages between Human Rights Abuses, 
Armed Groups, Mining of Conflict Minerals, and Commercial products (2012) 
• The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-
Affected and High-Risk Areas (2011) 
• The ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism Manual (2011) 
 
We used discourse analysis to interrogate these policy documents. Multiple types of discourse 
analysis have been used to examine political documents (Glynos et al. 2009; Jorgensen and Phillips 
2002). Eminent examples include critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1995), which focuses on the 
role of power and social structure in restricting people’s free choice of discursive behaviour, and 
political discourse theory, which was developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) to examine how 
discourse historically evolves and delimits social action. This study used a more recent branch of 
policy discourse analysis—interpretive policy analysis (IPA) (Fisher 2003; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; 
Yanow 2000). IPA emphasises the importance of interpretation and value, aiming to understand the 
‘production of meaning’ in policy and how this meaning becomes communicated through discourse 
(Yanow 2000). IPA is particularly relevant for the present study, which examines a recent policy 
domain that has produced many initiatives by different parties and stakeholders. 
 
IPA was developed as a response to mainstream positivist forms of policy evaluation of the 1960s 
and 1970s, which perceived social ‘problems’ as readily identifiable and objective in nature and 
assumed that governments were there to solve or at least react to those problems (Bacchi 2010). 
These positivist approaches attributed non-achievement of policy goals and unintended 
consequences to errors in the policy programme, its instruments or its implementation. IPA, in 
contrast, questions the discourse of the ‘policy problem’ and thus looks at how the policy problem is 
framed (Bacchi 2010; Verloo 2005; Yanow 2000). A frame gives meaning to reality and shapes how it 
is understood (Verloo 2005: 20). Loosely combining Bacchi’s (2009) methodological focus on problem 
framing and Verloo’s (2005) focus on attributed roles in such problem framing, our analysis focuses 
on the ‘framing’ of the policy problem through the interrogation of the policy documents on three 
questions: 
 
1. How is the problem represented? How do the documents ‘see’ the cause of the problem, and 
why is it a problem? Who has contributed to the problem, and who is affected? 
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2. What solution follows from this problematisation? What needs to be done and why? Which 
objectives are incorporated in this solution, and how are those objectives prioritised? 
 
3. What is the proposed plan of action to achieve the policy objectives? Which instruments are 
suggested, and who are the problem solvers? 
 
Apart from a discourse analysis of the four policy documents, the article also draws on empirical 
research concerning governance and the reforms in the artisanal mining sector in Katanga province 
conducted by the first author as part of a PhD project7. This makes some of the observations specific 
for this province. 
Findings 
What is the problem, who causes it and who are the victims? 
All of the examined policies highlight the problematic link between the continuing conflict in eastern 
DRC and the country’s extractive industry. Coordination and interaction between the various policy-
making processes have resulted in alignment and reinforced the policy makers’ representation of the 
policy problem.  
All of the documents maintain that armed group involvement in the eastern Congolese mining sector 
is detrimental to peace because the exploitation of conflict minerals provides armed groups with the 
financial means to finance their war efforts. The documents also stress that the generation of 
financial means by armed groups has negative consequences for the security situation and leads to 
serious human rights abuses, including sexual violence (OECD 2011; US Congress 2010: 838) and the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons (ICGLR 2011: 2; UN Group of Experts 2010: 85). 
This link between conflict and natural resources, so central in conflict mineral policy, has been 
criticised by multiple authors, who have argued that the policies overestimate the role of natural 
resources in the Congolese conflict. The UN Integrated Bureau, for example, estimated in 2011 that 
only 8% of all conflicts in DRC were related to access to natural resources (Autesserre 2012: 10), even 
though being contested by critics in the years after its publication. Others have argued that the 
militarised mineral trade is a symptom of the conflict and an ill-functioning state rather than the 
cause of these things (Seay 2012: 17). In the view of multiple scholars, the cause of Congo’s conflict is 
to be found instead in a complex range of factors such as access to land, migration issues and 
                                                          
7 This project is part of an integrated research programme: ‘Down to Earth: Governance dynamics and social 
change in artisanal and small-scale mining in DRC’. This programme was implemented by the special 
chairgroup of Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction at Wageningen University from 2012 to 2016. 
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contestation over traditional power (Nest 2006; Rose 2004). Although presenting the mineral sector 
as the financial motor of the Congolese conflict might be accurate, it is also a highly selective 
representation of reality. Armed groups also derive income from other sources, including illegal 
timber and charcoal production in South Kivu; revenues collected at roadblocks (Seay 2012: 19); and 
poaching, fishing and controlling bush meat markets around Virunga National Park (UN Group of 
Experts 2010: 67–76).  
None of the policy documents under study explicitly argues that the mineral sector is the ‘root 
cause’, ‘key driver’ or ‘main financer’ of conflict, as Salter and Mthembu-Salter have correctly 
pointed out (2016: 2). However, it is the only driver that receives such large-scale policy attention, 
and peacebuilding efforts in DRC may be considered unbalanced as a result. Given the complex 
nature of conflict in DRC, the effect of mineral reform on the restoration of peace is an open 
question. The actual effect is likely to be indirect and may take some time to materialise. 
A second bias in the policy documents concerns the extensive emphasis on ‘armed criminal 
networks’, whereas the problematic role of ‘civil/government criminal networks’ is, to varying 
extents, omitted. This emphasis on armed groups calls attention to the fact that the representation 
of the problem in conflict mineral policy is based on characteristics of Congo’s conflict-ridden 
provinces of Orientale (Ituri) and North and South Kivu, which are not representative of other 
Congolese provinces. In Maniema and the former Katanga, for example, mineral extraction and trade 
are much less militarised. Most mining communities in these regions are rather confronted with 
extortive taxation practices and mine pit expropriations by state officials, than issues of 
militarization. Throughout the eastern and southern provinces, it is not only the personal economic 
interests of high-ranking FARDC commanders that seriously hinder the mining communities’ ability to 
benefit from the sector (UN Group of Experts 2010: 75–76). Additionally, former and current 
ministers, governors and civil servants of mining services such as SAESSCAM are engaged to a 
significant extent in extortion or facilitating mineral smuggling (UN Group of Experts 2010: 73) or are 
allegedly involved in owning mineral cooperatives or hold shares in large mineral buying houses. This 
dubious role played by Congolese high officials renders access to mineral trade and exploitation 
subjects to political power struggles. Yet the conflicts of interests deriving from these non-military, 
civilian criminal networks are not addressed by conflict-mineral policy and the politicians and high 
officials implicated are not held accountable. Rather, the policy documents mention the Congolese 
government as an important stakeholder, not taking into account the negative role of these state 
actors.  
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With regard to the question of victims, we found an interesting and significant variation in the policy 
documents. All of the documents start from the position that the Congolese population is affected by 
the problem and recognise their suffering from human rights abuses. However, the OECD Guidance 
and the UN Group of Experts report also draw extensive attention to the fact that (Western) 
downstream companies risk contributing to or being associated with conflict and human rights 
abuses. They implicitly view Western consumers as affected, pointing out that consumers should be 
able to choose conflict-free products. 
 
Between ‘reducing human suffering’ and ‘conflict free sourcing’; varying formulations of the conflict 
mineral policy objective 
Following from the representation of the problem casting the mining sector as an economic driver of 
conflict, the policies take a rather economic approach to the peacebuilding problem, searching for its 
solution in changing the economic value chain of minerals. Conflict funding is to be reduced through 
the regulation of the mineral trade and the close monitoring of commercial activities in DRC. The 
origin of minerals must be determined to enable companies to avoid sourcing from conflict-affected 
mine sites or from dubious sellers, such as FARDC elements. Creating transparency, sharing 
information and increasing oversight over the mineral supply chain are at the core of all four policies. 
On closer scrutiny, however, it is less clear what common objective is supposed to be met by the 
policies. First, we need to distinguish how the policy documents frame the problem—and 
consequently conflict minerals—from the discourse broadcasted by many NGOs. In contrast to this 
discourse, conflict mineral policies do not claim to ‘end conflict’ by means of due diligence or 
transparency, as Salter and Mthembu-Salter ( 2016: 2) have correctly highlighted. The UN Group of 
Experts report, for example, is modest about this expectation, stating that ‘due diligence on its own 
is unlikely to stop conflict in the area’, although it concludes that ‘it will have a positive impact’ (UN 
Group of Experts 2010: 86). Likewise, the Dodd–Frank Act proposes the development of ‘a plan to 
promote peace and security’, in which monitoring commercial activities is just one part, alongside, 
for example, ‘stronger governance that can facilitate and improve transparency’ (US Congress 2010: 
840).  
But if ‘ending the conflict’’ is not the objective of conflict mineral policy, then what is? Our analysis 
uncovered distinct formulations of the policy objective throughout the four policy documents. These 
vary from ‘reducing human suffering’ and ‘promoting peace’ to ‘avoiding conflict contribution’ and 
‘conflict-free sourcing’ . The varying formulations of the objective are in line with each other, and all 
four policies seem to adhere in one way or another to these different formulations. Yet, we argue 
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that the four policies differ in their emphasis. Highlighting this difference in emphasis is important, as 
it may help explain some of the seeming incongruences of the policy implementation as the different 
emphases result in differing policy scopes and hence differing possible impact. To visualize these 
specific emphases, Figure 2 depicts the different formulations as a continuum with two extremes, 
along which the four policy documents are placed.  
Figure 2: A continuum: varying formulations of the conflict mineral policy objective 
Reducing human suffering        Conflict-free sourcing  
Dodd–Frank Act     OECD Guidance  
     ICGLR Manual   UN Group of Experts report  
 
The Dodd–Frank Act and the ICGLR Manual are placed on the left side of the continuum. Even though 
both documents certainly pay attention to conflict-free sourcing (the Act through its requirement for 
US stock exchange-listed companies to verify mineral origin and the ICGLR Manual by proposing 
amongst others a certification mechanism), their emphasis is on the aim of stopping human suffering 
and the illicit trafficking of armaments. The Act for example explicitly mentions the ‘extreme levels of 
violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, 
and the contribution to an emergency humanitarian situation therein’ (US Congress 2010: 838). The 
ICGLR Manual highlights ‘the negative impact of conflict on regional stability’ and how ‘the trade in 
designated minerals can be directly linked to the illicit traffic in, and proliferation of […] small arms 
and light weapons’ (ICGLR 2011: 2).   
In contrast, the OECD Guidance and the UN Group of Experts report are placed on the right-hand 
side. Although the UN groups of Expert’s report very extensively discusses the human suffering of 
population in Congo’s conflict-ridden provinces, both this report and the OECD Guidance focus lies 
on conflict-free sourcing and preventing the contribution to conflict. The OECD document is oriented 
towards ‘the importance of responsible sourcing’ and the need to avoid ‘contributing to or being 
associated with human rights abuses and conflict’ (idem: 12). And the UN Group of Experts states 
that avoiding contributing to conflict is important not only for the promotion of peace, but also to 
avoid ‘the risk of being considered for sanction’ (UN Group of Experts 2010: 84). 
Although the continuum helps us to better understand the different policies’ foci it is not 
immediately clear what difference this makes in the implementation of the policies. The various 
formulations are clearly in line with each other, and one could argue that the one follows from the 
other: Contribution to conflict should be avoided in order to promote peace and reduce human 
suffering. However, we argue instead that the different emphasis placed by the policies makes a 
difference, especially when they are analysed in conjunction with how the policies speak of the 
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solutions and the different affected parties they primarily address.Portraying the formulations on a 
continuum, does highlight an important issue. It clarifies foremost that it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to say what these policies as a whole8 hold as a priority. Findings discussed further in the article 
indicate that giving buyers a clear conscience and allowing multinational firms to avoid bad publicity 
may have got more prominence than contributing to the situation on the ground in DRC.  
 
How will the objectives be achieved? 
Following from the proposed solution, which highlights the need to reduce conflict funding, the 
course of action proposed by the policies revolves around international requirements for companies 
to exercise due diligence throughout their mineral supply chains. In this process, a large role is given 
to the private sector, and the Congolese state is expected to provide oversight. 
Together, the reform policies should enable companies to source conflict-free minerals. Traceability 
enables companies to verify the origin of their minerals, and the iTSCi chain of custody tracking is a 
good example that helps companies to map their supply chains and to collect and disclose relevant 
information necessary to comply with international due diligence standards. In addition, the 
certification of mine sites, export lots and exporters enabled by the ICGLR Regional Certification 
Mechanism ensures that companies source from conflict-free mine sites and from suppliers who are 
not engaged in conflict or human rights abuses. The ICGLR’s Regional Mineral Tracking Database and 
Regional Database of (certified) Exporters (ICGLR 2011a) provide ways to share and publicly disclose 
information on regional mineral flows and actors, facilitating the inspection of supply chain data by 
independent third-party auditors. 
However, this process of enhancing transparency takes a narrow approach. It singles out one 
element of the mining sector, namely commercial transactions within the mineral supply chain, 
leaving out other important elements of the sector: local mining governance, access provision to 
mineral exploitation and trade, and the levying of taxes on mining and trade activities. Although the 
transparency mechanisms are impressive, they do not reach into these other aspects of the sector. 
Hence, statements such as the one made in the OECD evaluation report of 2012 (‘The iTSCi project 
has considerably enhanced transparency and good governance in the 3T mineral sector’) tend to 
overextend expectations of these transparency achievements. Achievements in the supply chain 
should not be mistaken for advances in transparency throughout the sector as a whole. 
                                                          
8 We say ‘as a whole’ as at this point in time it has become impossible, after six years of joint implementation to 
entangle them and treat them separately in terms of results or effects.  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
 
Although the focus on transparent value chains sounds positive, there is little consideration of the 
fact that such a reordering of artisanal mineral supply chains is not a neutral process (Diemel 
forthcoming). This process demands that mine sites be listed and subdivided, demarcated and 
assigned to appropriate license holders. It demands that supply chain actors be identifiable, 
preferably by their full name, government registration number and address (ICGLR 2011: Appendix 
4b). Thus, it can only work with registered, formal actors using payments that are ‘preferably routed 
through official banking channels’ (idem). Most artisanal miners and small-scale traders (negociants) 
who formerly worked in the scattered and informal sector do not fit into this highly organised and 
rigid supply chain model. Consequently, the demand for oversight and governability leads to the 
exclusion of many of those actors from the sector, or at the least a deterioration of their position. 
 
Who is responsible for the implementation?  
The policies ascribe a large role to commercial actors, who must exercise due diligence in their own 
supply chains. Importers and processors of 3T minerals and large-scale buyers downstream in the 
mineral supply chain have been made responsible for setting up and financing the reform 
mechanisms. The iTSCi traceability scheme was developed as a joint initiative by the tin industry, and 
a large part of the funding for the implementation of the scheme in Katanga was provided by Mining 
Mineral Resources, a large-scale Indian mineral buying company (Diemel and Cuvelier 2015). 
Congolese state authorities have been made responsible for monitoring and providing oversight over 
mineral extraction and cross-border trade. This requires a permanent presence of public mining 
service agents in close proximity to the mine sites and mineral depots. Their tasks include the 
administration of the mineral extraction, trade and export volumes, as well as verifying that mineral 
loads and associated actors are in compliance with the international standards (ICGLR 2011: 
Appendix 4b). State mining authorities are expected ‘to inspect all mine sites within national 
boundaries’, decide upon the conflict status of each of these mines, maintain a mine site database 
and issue export certificates (ICGLR 2011b). To fulfil these tasks, the Dodd–Frank Act and the related 
US strategy highlight the need to develop ‘stronger governance and economic institutions’ (US 
Congress 2010: 840) and propose ‘increas[ing] the presence of mining authorities in mining sites and 
along trade routes’ (US Secretary of State and USAID 2011: 2). 
 
The policy documents treat the Congolese government as a legitimate and capable actor playing a 
significant role in providing a solution to the problematic link between natural resources and conflict. 
However, this stands in sharp contrast with the recognition of state actors as part of the conflict 
minerals problem. The central state has installed and extended local government agencies such as 
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SAESSCAM to execute traceability schemes, but it does not sufficiently support these offices 
financially (Diemel forthcoming). The local offices function autonomously, with civil servants relying 
on local formal or informal taxes to support themselves. According to Autesserre (2012: 219), 
Congolese state officials ‘are responsible for the largest part of all human rights violations’. Our 
fieldwork9 in the mine sites of central Katanga revealed the involvement of local civil servants, the 
mining police and intelligence service agents in illegal taxation practices and the expropriation of 
productive mine pits under the pretext of safety risks. 
Not taking the de facto functioning of the Congolese state authorities sufficiently into account, the 
policies expect them to play a positive role in mining sector reform. While extending state authority 
might improve the mineral trade administration, in a country plagued with a malfunctioning state, 
this approach risks enabling state authorities to become the new predators in artisanal mining areas. 
To compensate for the lack of capable state involvement, private mineral buyers also take on a role 
in assisting the Ministry of Mines in the implementation of traceability and certification schemes at 
mine sites. At a significant number of the mine sites, these private actors pay civils servants’ salaries 
(primes de motivation), provide motorbikes to local state offices, and organise the transport of the 
civil servants—by helicopter or car—to the mine sites. Additionally, these private companies play an 
active role in the functioning of the system, for example through their participation in local10 and 
provincial11 multi-stakeholder meetings on traceability and certification issues, where information 
exchange and communication takes place between state authorities, private industry actors, local 
communities and civil society (Congolese Ministry of Mines 2012). 
One could argue that it is only natural for the private sector to take up such a central role in the 
development and financing of due diligence, as it is their responsibility ‘to do no harm’ and to prove 
their responsible sourcing practices to the international community and to their consumers. 
However, in a country characterised by a malfunctioning public administration (Trefon 2009), where 
basic services are usually provided by non-state actors such as churches, international NGOs 
(Bwimana 2017), rebel groups (Meagher 2012; Raeymaekers 2007) or transnational mining 
companies (Hönke 2009; Hönke and Thauer 2014), the private sector playing such an extensive role 
risks further privatising mining governance. 
Remarkably, this prominent role is not allocated to the private sector as a whole; rather, it seems to 
be geared more towards large-scale mineral buyers (comptoirs), than to artisanal and small-scale 
                                                          
9 17 months of qualitative research undertaken from March 2013 to April 2016.  
10 Comité Local de Suivi, Local Monitoring Committees 
11 Comité de Pilotage Provincial, Provincial Steering Committees 
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miners or traders. International requirements and the need for traceability demands for mine sites to 
be listed, demarcated and attributed to a single appropriate license holder. It demands for supply 
chain actors to be clearly identifiable, preferably with full name, government registration number 
and address (ICGLR 2011; Appendix 4b); and for mineral trade to be concluded with ‘non-cash 
purchases’ and ‘preferably routed through official banking channels’ (Idem). These requirements all 
indicate that the creation of a ‘clear and transparent’ supply chain is not a neutral process. It favors 
large-scale well-organized actors such as comptoirs and cooperatives with access to financial 
infrastructure and international debates, over small-scale actors such as artisanal miners and 
negociants, who have seen their trading position become restricted and their negotiation position 
deteriorated since the arrival of these new actors (Diemel forthcoming). 
This demand for oversight, risks to pay too little attention to the dispersed nature of artisanal mining 
and to exclude those actors who are not able to adjust fast enough to these emerging international 
standards. Taking an artisanal mine site in mind, where hundreds of artisanal miners without fixed 
address or ID cards extract minerals, one can easily see how those actors do not fit particularly very 
well into this new, highly organized supply chain model. From a due diligence point of view it makes 
sense to put larger private actors at the centre of interventions aiming for clearer supply chains. 
Yet, what stands out from the documents reviewed is the general absence of the mentioning of this 
large group of small-scale ASM operators, which might make up over 90% of all supply chain actors. 
Except for those cases where they are represented as marginalised actors, either victimized by the 
problematic link between mineral trade and conflict financing or by the harsh working conditions and 
low revenues of the artisanal mining sector. 
In line with this trend policy makers at both the national and the international levels seem to believe 
that the gradual eradication of artisanal mining is the solution (U.S. Secretary of State and USAID 
2011;2). The US strategy linked to the Dodd Frank Act for instance, proposes to get artisanal miners 
out of mining activities and into alternative livelihoods in order to reduce their vulnerability. The idea 
of creating alternative economic activities for those people is understandable. Yet, the reality is that 
two million small-scale miners (World Bank 2008)—approximately 14–16% of the Congolese 
population—depend heavily on artisanal mining for their survival.  
Pushing towards a disappearance of the artisanal sector while neither the malfunctioning Congolese 
state nor the financially overburdened donor community is likely capable to create alternative 
livelihoods for this group of actors, risks to leave a large part of the artisanal miners and their 
dependent without a way to fend for themselves.  
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Analysis and conclusion 
A review of the literature on the reforms of DRC’s artisanal and small-scale mining sector highlighted 
three issues of concern: 1) the reforms’ insecure and variable consequences for conflict, 2) the 
continuous effects of the reforms on livelihoods, and 3) the pace and scope of the reforms. We asked 
how to label these concerns: Do they point to unintended effects and misdirected implementation, 
or are these issues largely embedded in the design of the policy? And what do these concerns tell us 
about the nature of the reforms? This article aimed to answer these questions through a discourse 
analysis of four central conflict mineral policy documents. 
 
We found that although there are some inconsistencies between the policy documents, they seem to 
problematize the issue of ‘conflict-minerals’ in a rather uniform way; ‘revenues from mineral trade 
seem to fuel violent conflict’. Also in proposing a solution, the policy unilaterally focus on increasing 
transparency and oversight over the economic value chain of minerals. Our main finding concerns 
the ambiguous formulations of the objective identified in the reforms. It appears difficult, if not 
impossible, to say what these policies as a whole hold as a priority, running from ‘‘promoting 
peacebuilding and reducing human suffering’ to ‘‘avoiding contribution to conflict and hence 
sourcing minerals in a conflict-free manner’. The policy documents move between these two 
extremes, with differing emphasis. The Dodd–Frank Act and the ICGLR Manual seem to formulate 
their objective more in terms of ‘reducing human suffering’, whereas the UN Group of Experts report 
and the OECD Guidance’s formulation of objectives focusses on conflict-free sourcing and exercising 
due diligence. These differences in emphasis are for an important part due to the difference 
audiences the policy documents address. Additionally, one could convincibly argue that the distinct 
formulations of the objective should be viewed as aligned: one has to source responsibly in order to 
promote peacebuilding and reduce human suffering.  
 
However, the significance of this ambiguity becomes clear when we combine it with the various ways 
the policies frame the problem of ‘conflict-minerals’, and especially in how these documents define 
the affected parties. A part of the analysed documents view the Congolese population as the party 
primarily affected by conflict minerals, whereas the OECD Guidance clearly adds international 
companies and consumers to this group of affected parties, due to possible conflict associations of 
their choices and purchases, even if they intend to avoid conflict. There is an additional reason for 
the objectives to be less aligned than often presumed. Sourcing responsibly might in theory lead to 
the promotion of peacebuilding and reduced human suffering by the hands of armed groups, 
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scholarly work over the last 6 years does point out the latter does not automatically follow from the 
former.  
 
Putting the ambiguity of these objectives in sharp relief, we could ask whether giving buyers a clear 
conscience and developing a traceable and conflict-free product has not gotten more prominence 
than contributing to improving the situation of a large part of the Congolese population. As the 
policies can thus be ‘read’ in different ways, this may also explain the different interpretations that 
we find in the literature about the reforms, where some authors consider the reforms effective 
whereas others point primarily to negative effects. 
 
While all policies express a combination of the various formulations of the objective, many of the 
points raised in our analysis and review of past work, point out that the evolving practice is especially 
compatible with the objective of seeking assurance that minerals in international markets are 
conflict-free, while having a negative effect on the objective of reducing human suffering: 
 
• The tendency for the reforms to be implemented in areas that are free of conflict, where it is 
easier to assure that minerals are conflict-free, yet not where implementation in terms of human 
suffering is the most needed; 
• The narrow focus of the reforms on the transparency of the mineral value chain, rather than on 
the governance of the mineral sector as a whole which would potentially have a larger positive 
effect on the mining communities; 
• The large role accorded to the Congolese state as an important part of the solution, while neither 
considering the dubious role played by many civil servants and high state officials, nor 
recognizing that an extension of the Congolese state apparatus risks new forms of predation for 
the mining communities; and 
• The lack of systematic attention to the deterioration of small-scale artisanal operators’ 
negotiation position and access to free mineral trade, as international requirements for clearer 
supply chains have proven to be preferential for large scale-actors such as comptoirs and 
cooperatives than for the former.  
 
The ambiguity of the policy objectives revealed by our discourse analysis urges a revisiting of the 
priorities of the policies. Although the policies set out to organise transparency in order to reduce 
suffering, our findings suggest that exercising due diligence in avoiding the funding of conflict has 
become a goal in itself. If the reforms have indeed become primarily a process geared towards 
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guaranteeing international companies and consumers access to minerals that have been sourced in a 
conflict-free manner, this raises the pertinent question of what this means for the objective of 
promoting peacebuilding and reducing human suffering, which was so central to the advocacy 
campaigns of the early 2000s that spurred the reforms. This should be a central question in 
evaluating the intended and unintended consequences of the reforms. 
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